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ABSTRACT
We study the interaction between individuals in a population, where each individual en-
counters one another at random intervals, and in each encounter the two individuals play
one round of the game of prisoner’s dilemma. By discounting future reward, and allowing
for imperfect memory and mobility of the individuals, we study the evolutionary equilib-
rium strategy to identify situations where cooperation emerges. We find that cooperation
among individuals typically emerges when future reward becomes more important, when
individuals in the population have better memory, and when the individuals move in and
out of the population less frequently. The findings help explain social loafing and free rider
commonly seen in towns, corporations, and military units.
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Executive Summary
People in a group typically become less motivated to exert effort for the common good,
when the group size grows. This phenomenon is known as social loafing in social psychol-
ogy, and there has been extensive research on its causes and remedies. The purpose of this
thesis is to use a mathematical model to explain social loafing. The mathematical model
uses the game of prisoner’s dilemma as the building block, and identifies situations when
cooperation is likely to emerge. The findings also suggest a few methods that help motivate
cooperation.
Specifically, this thesis presents a game-theoretic model for interaction between individu-
als in a finite population. Each individual encounters one another at random intervals, and
in each encounter the two individuals play one round of the game of prisoner’s dilemma.
The game of prisoner’s dilemma has been the canonical example in game theory, where
the individually optimal policy (defect) is opposite to the socially optimal policy (cooper-
ate). In other words, a selfish, rational player’s optimal action will lead to a less desirable
outcome for the entire group. The prisoner’s dilemma has seen many applications in arm
races, harvest of natural resources, price competition between retail stores, among others.
In our context, if the two individuals in the population encounter only once and will not
see each other again in the future, then the individually optimal policy is to defect (exert
minimal effort) rather than to cooperate (exert maximal effort).
To study the situations where cooperation is likely to emerge, we introduce three factors
into the model. First, we introduce a discount factor so that the utility earned in the future
is worth less than the same utility earned today. Second, we introduce the memory factor
of an individual, so that each individual will remember past encounters for some random
amount of time. If an individual encounters another person repeatedly, then he can use past
experience to decide what to do in the future. Third, we allow individuals to move in and
out of the population at random intervals.
To make our game-theoretic model mathematically tractable, we restrict each individual to
four strategies: tit-for-two-tats (TF2T), tit-for-tat (TFT), suspicious-tit-for-tat (STFT), and
always defect (AD). The first three strategies are similar, with the difference being how
xv
to play a stranger. When encountering a stranger, TF2T will begin by cooperation twice,
TFT by cooperating once, and STFT by defecting once. After the initial moves, in each
encounter, the three strategies will mirror what the opponent did in the previous encounter.
The fourth strategy considered, AD, simply defects every time. Therefore, TF2T can be
viewed as the most cooperative strategy, TFT the second most cooperative, while the AD
the least cooperative.
To analyze system equilibrium, we focus on finding the evolutionary equilibrium strategy
for a given set of model parameters. A strategy is evolutionary stable—possibly a mixed
strategy—if it is optimal for an individual to adopt the same strategy, when the vast ma-
jority of the population is playing that strategy. Depending on the model parameters, the
evolutionarily stable strategy contains different subsets of the four strategies under consid-
eration. We find that cooperation among individuals typically emerges (TF2T and TFT)
when future reward becomes more important, when individuals in the population have bet-
ter memory, and when the individuals move in and out of the population less frequently.
We also find that suspicion (STFT) is a form of behavior that increases the robustness of
cooperation under certain situations.
In this thesis, several assumptions may not be entirely realistic. First, each player has
to pick a strategy from a set of four options, whereas in real-life people may be more
creative in choosing a strategy. Second, we use the geometric distribution to model an
individual’s memory, and also for the duration of time an individual stays in the population
before moving out. Third, we assume that the population is homogeneous; that is, every
individual has the same value functions. In real-life, however, the pay-off for cooperation
may be higher for some people than for some other people. Fourth, we assume that each
individual will encounter every other individual in the population with the same probability,
whereas in real-life neighbors may encounter more frequently. Relaxing these assumptions
presents challenging future research directions.
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Social scientists use the term “social loafing” to describe the reduction in cooperation in a
group, as the size of the group increases. This phenomenon is surely familiar to anyone who
has worked on projects in an academic, commercial or military setting. It is the goal of this
study to give a game theoretic explanation to the lack of cooperation in large populations.
The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) has been the canonical example in game theory for a game
where mutual defection is the only equilibrium, while it is not in the best interest of both
players as a group. It was introduced by Merril Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950, and later
revised to the modern form by Albert Tucker (Kuhn, 2009). In this game, two players have
been arrested by the police as suspects in a joint crime. Both suspects are under pressure
from police investigators to confess, since they cannot produce enough evidence to convict
the two of the crime. Should no one confess, they both can expect to receive short prison
sentences for some reduced crime. Should one confess, while the other holds out, the one
that confessed will go free, while the other bears the maximum prison sentence. If both
confess, they are both convicted and spend a significant amount of time in prison, but less
than the maximum.
We use standard notation for PD in this thesis. We will call T the pay-off for Temptation, or
free-riding, R the Reward for mutual cooperation, P the Punishment for mutual defection
and S the Sucker’s pay-off. These satisfy the inequalities T > R > P > S and R > T+S2 .
Table 1 presents the game in standard matrix form, where C notates cooperation, which in
the case of the prisoners, is to not confess, and D, defection, which for the prisoners is to
confess.
As seen in Table 1.1, the game is symmetric between the two players, and D dominates C,
since T >R and P> S. Hence, the only Nash equilibrium in a single round of PD is for both
players to play D, getting pay-off P. However, both players can do better by both playing
C to get pay-off R. The players’ pursuit of their individual optimum in a single game
1
C D
C (R,R) (S,T )
D (T,S) (P,P)
Table 1.1: Pay-offs for a two-person prisoner's dilemma.
leads to the Nash equilibrium of both players defecting, which is worse than the social
optimum of both players cooperating. This phenomenon has a wide range of applications
in human interactions, where pursuit of individual interests leads to sub-optimal results for
society. Examples include arms races between countries, harvest of natural resources, price
competition between retail stores, among others.
1.2 Literature Review
Iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) is a long term game consisting of several rounds, where
each round is a PD. The game is a subject of research, as it allows a socially optimal equi-
librium to emerge under certain conditions. IPD has been studied extensively theoretically
and experimentally. Axelrod (1984) has presented a theoretical framework and a series of
experiments conducted in the form of competitions between computer algorithms. He finds
that cooperation will be beneficial if “the future” is important enough. Axelrod continues
to define and find the value of the “shadow of the future” parameter, also called the dis-
count parameter, for which the strategy of tit-for-tat is collectively stable. Tit-for-tat is a










where α is the discount parameter.
Cooperation in groups has been researched as an iterated game based on PD. Researchers
use the concept of N-person IPD (NIPD). In this game N players are engaged in an IPD.
Each round of the game all players play simultaneously. It may be parametrized with b/N
as the reward to each player for every player that cooperates and c as the personal cost of




− c= b− c
It is assumed that b > c > bN , in order to maintain the assumptions of PD (Bendor &
Mookherjee, 1987). Cooperation between all is possible under certain conditions using
different strategies. Research has been conducted to ascertain limits to this cooperation in
groups.
Joshi (1987) studies tit-for-tat strategies in NIPD. Several strategies were explored with
varying degrees of leniency towards defection. Joshi characterizes the strategies according
to the proportion of cooperators in the group needed for a certain player to cooperate. The
least lenient of these, the strategy requiring total cooperation by everyone in the group
for continued collaboration he dubs “hard” and finds it to be stable against defection. It
was found, however, that as the number of players in the game increased, the threshold
for the frequency of the “hard TFT” strategy to become dominant rose. This suggests that
evolution of cooperation in this scenario is more difficult in larger groups.
Bendor & Mookherjee (1987) find that in NIPD “If relative to group size n the punishment
phase is sufficiently long and the members do not discount the future very heavily, there is
an equilibrium in which all members cooperate every period. However, given the discount
rate α there is an upper limit n∗ beyond which cooperative outcome cannot be upheld.”




where b/n is the contribution of cooperation by any player to the pay-off of others and c
is the personal cost of cooperating. In a study of common goods problems with various
utility functions, Pecorino (1999), finds similar results for cooperation being feasible, yet
increasingly hard to achieve as the number of players in a game grows.
A different approach towards studying iterated games in large populations, is to treat a
grid of players each interacting only with his neighbours, called spatial IPD. Applying this
approach has led Nowak & Jay (1993) to conclude that the dynamics of such games are
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significantly different than homogeneous IPD and may be chaotic.
“Social loafing” is a term coined by social psychologists as the deterioration of cooperation
as group size increases (Karau & Williams, 1993). We have described two game-theoretic
approaches, the N-person iterated prisoner’s dilemma and the spatial IPD, that may offer
explanations for this type of observational research.
1.3 Contribution
In this thesis a model of iterated games in finite populations is used to analyze dynamics of
large populations. The model allows for specific targeting of punishment against defectors
and may allow a more accurate prediction of conditions under which cooperation is benefi-
cial. This model may offer an appropriate explanation to situations of cooperation in large
groups. Specifically, we make the following contribution to the literature.
1. Develop a game-theoretic model for individuals who meet randomly in a population,
where in each encounter the two individuals interact according to PD.
2. For a given set of model parameters, develop a method to mathematically identify
the equilibrium states of the game-theoretic model.
3. Explain the influence of several factors on the feasibility of cooperation. These fac-
tors include (1) population size, (2) memory and mobility of individuals in the pop-
ulation, and (3) discount factor.




Consider a finite population with N individuals. The game proceeds one round at a time,
and goes on indefinitely. In each round, every member of the population is randomly
paired with another member for a single round of prisoner’s dilemma. In other words, each
member in the population faces a steady stream of members who are randomly chosen from
a fixed population with replacement. In a small population, a player may expect to see the
same players again and again at small intervals, while for larger populations a player may
expect to meet players few times in the foreseeable future. For each encounter between two
players a standard prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is played with the pay-off shown in Table 1.
In this model, the concept of a “foreseeable future” is governed by two factors: a discount
factor α and a memory factor β . The discount factor α signifies that a reward 1 received
in the next round is only worth α as in the present round. The memory factor β models
how well each individual remembers encounters with the other individuals from the past.
Specifically, if two players recognize each other at the current round, then they will rec-
ognize each other in the next round with probability β , or forget about each other in the
next round with probability 1− β . In other words, the number of turns before memory
of an encounter between two players is lost is a geometric random variable. The memory
factor β can also be interpreted as a mobility factor. In each round, with probability β , an
individual in the population may move out and be replaced by another individual moving
in.
The model is governed by seven parameters, the four standard parameters of a PD, two
parameters for the foreseeable future and a single parameter for the population size. The
size of the population will be referred to as N, future discount as α , memory retention as β
and the notation for pay-offs in the PD are T , R, P and S.
2.1 Model Strategies
The model presented so far is rather general and there exists a myriad of player strategies.
However, for the purpose of studying the emergence and failure of cooperation we choose
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to introduce four simple strategies. The pool of four strategies will be assumed to be the
only options available to the N players in the population. Each player may select a strategy
out of the pool and play accordingly for the remainder of the game. The four strategies are
tit-for-tat (TFT), tit-for-two-tats (TF2T), suspicious-tit-for-tat (STFT) and always defection
(AD). This assumption limits the generality of our results.
2.1.1 Always Defection
A strategy that defects unconditionally in every round of the game, as such it is designated
mean. This is the dominant strategy for a single round of prisoner’s dilemma.
2.1.2 Tit-For-Tat
The TFT strategy, first presented by Anatol Rapaport for PD computer tournaments held by
Robert Axelrod (Axelrod, 1984), has been studied extensively and shown to be an effective
strategy in many situations. The strategy is extremely simple. If it meets an opponent
whom it has never played before (or doesn’t remember playing before), it plays cooperate.
From that point on it mirrors the opponent’s previous move. This strategy is a nice strategy
since it will never defect first (Axelrod, 1984). If both players use TFT, then cooperation
occurs with each player receiving a stream of rewards.
2.1.3 Suspicious-Tit-For-Tat
This strategy is a variation of standard TFT. The difference lies in the strategy’s action
against an unknown opponent. This strategy will begin an interaction by defecting and will
then mirrors the opponent’s moves. This strategy may be said to be mean as it will never
cooperate first. STFT is important to this paper, as we conjecture that use of suspicion by a
population is a method for increasing the robustness of cooperation.
2.1.4 Tit-For-Two-Tats
This strategy was suggested by Robert Axelrod for the second of his computer tournaments
as a solution to the problem of two retaliatory strategies (such as TFT) entering a cycle
of alternating cooperation and defection (Axelrod, 1984). This nice strategy begins by
cooperating twice and then continues to mirror it’s opponents moves. In that case, it will
begin to defect until the opponent cooperates once.
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2.2 The Game in Standard Matrix Form
In order to examine the dynamics among the four strategies in this finite-population model,
the first step is to define an objective function for each member in the population. In this
thesis, we assume that the objective for each member is to maximize his expected total
discounted utility. In other words, if Xt represents the utility received in round t, then a




α tE[Xt ]. (2.1)
An alternative approach to compute the objective function in (2.1) is to first compute the
expected total discounted utility collected through one match-up. A match-up is a sequence
of encounters between two players until the two players forget about each other. In other
words, if a player meets someone whom he does not recognize (an opponent he has never
played before, or an opponent he has played before but forgets), then a new match-up
begins. If a player meets someone he recognizes from previous encounters, then that round
is part of an ongoing match-up.
Let ai, j denote the total expected discounted utility collected through one match-up,
if a member plays strategy i against another member who plays strategy j, for i, j ∈
{TF2T,TFT,STFT,AD}. The matrix A is shown explicitly in the following.
A=

TF2T TFT STFT AD
TF2T a1,1 a1,2 a1,3 a1,4
TFT a2,1 a2,2 a2,3 a2,4
STFT a3,1 a3,2 a3,3 a3,4
AD a4,1 a4,2 a4,3 a4,4
 (2.2)
In this matrix, a2,3, for example, is the discounted total expected utility a TFT player col-
lects through a match-up, if he meets a stranger who plays STFT.
Suppose the population plays a mixed strategy (q1,q2,q3,q4). That is, each time a member
meets someone he does not recognize (an opponent he has never played before, or an op-
ponent he has played before but forgets), the opponent will play strategy j with probability
7
q j, for j = 1,2,3,4. By letting It = 1 if the member does not recognize the opponent in
round t (beginning of a new match-up), and It = 0 if the member recognizes the opponent
in round t (part of an ongoing match-up), then an equivalent expression for the objective

























Since (∑∞t=0α tE[It ]) is a constant regardless the strategy played by the member, to maxi-





Consequently, an equivalent objective function for a member is to choose a strategy that
maximizes the total discounted expected utility collected in a match-up. We next explain
how to compute ai, j in (2.2).
2.2.1 Match-up Between Two Nice Strategies
The match-up between two nice players will be repeated cooperation, as both players will
never defect first. At the beginning of a round, denote the total expected discounted utility
collected in the remainder of this match-up by h(R), if two players will always play C, so
that in each encounter a player receives R. In the present round, the two players will meet
with probability 1/N. If they meet, then each player gets a reward R; otherwise, there is
no immediate reward. With probability β , the two players will remember each other in the
next round, and will collect h(R) in the next round, which is discounted by α . If they do
not meet, with probability 1− 1/N, then they will just get h(R) in the next round, if they












Solving for h(R) gives
h(R) =
R
N (1−αβ ) .
The function h(R) can be interpreted as the total expected, discounted utility in the remain-
der of the match-up, if a player receives R from each future encounter. This can then be
used in the expected utility of a match-up involving only TF2T and TFT.






2.2.2 Match-up Between Two Mean Strategies
The match-up between mean strategies will never have cooperation introduced, so the ex-
pected utility is derived exactly like the previous section, except for the per round pay-off
being P instead of R. Replacing R in equation (2.3) with P gives






2.2.3 Match-up Between TFT and AD
The first encounter of TFT and AD, in a match-up, will see TFT getting the sucker’s pay-
off, while AD gets the temptation pay-off. Every following encounter will be mutual defec-















2.2.4 Match-up Between TF2T and STFT
In the first encounter, TF2T gets S, while STFT gets T . In the second encounter and all
following encounters, both strategies will get the steady stream R. Similar to equation (2.3),
we can conclude that






Similarly, the pay-off for the STFT strategy is






2.2.5 Match-up Between TF2T and AD
In the case of TF2T against the AD strategy, the TF2T will allow two defections against
it before the interaction collapses into constant defection on both sides. We calculate by

























1−αβ (1− 1N ) .
The pay-off for AD in this match-up will be similar with the exception of T replacing S.
That is,












1−αβ (1− 1N ) .
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2.2.6 Match-up Between TFT and STFT
A match-up between TFT and STFT will always start by a defection on the side of the
suspicious strategy and continue with an endless cycle of defection on alternating sides.
This means that the expected utilities of the two strategies in this match-up are entwined.
We use x to mark the expected value of an alternating T and S match-up starting with the
sucker’s pay-off S, and y for the same match-up starting with the temptation pay-off T . We

































1−αβ (1− 1N ) .
Solving the two equations for x and y leads to the following




















2.2.7 Game Matrix in Normal Form




















































































In this thesis, we wish to find the connection between population size and other parameters
of a game and the possibility of cooperation in a stable steady state. To achieve this goal,
we first define a stable steady state. The common definition for such a state is the Nash
equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium of a game is a profile of actions (strategy), such that each
player’s action is optimal against the actions of the other players. In other words, no player
can increase his expected utility by switching to a different strategy, given that all the other
players play their Nash equilibrium strategy (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994).
Whereas Nash equilibrium specifies a stable state involving several players, an evolution-
arily stable strategy (ESS) is a refinement of Nash equilibrium that applies to a population.
Specifically, an ESS is a (possibly) mixed strategy that, if adopted by a population, can-
not be invaded by other strategies (Smith, 1974). Write E[U,V ] for the expected utility of
the strategy U in a match-up against the strategy V . We say S is an ESS if either of the
following two conditions hold:
1. E[S,S]> E[T,S], for all T 6= S; or
2. E[S,S] = E[T,S] and E[S,T ]> E[T,T ], for all T 6= S.
In this thesis, we seek to determine the ESS for our game-theoretic model introduced in
Chapter 2, as we attempt to ascertain the conditions required for a long term cooperative
equilibrium in a dynamic population. In this thesis, we focus on finding sets of game
parameters that allow a cooperative evolutionary stable (mixed) strategy to emerge.
3.1 Determine Evolutionary Stable Strategy
In this section, we analyze the two-person non-zero-sum game with pay-offs given in (2.4),
to determine the ESS for given parameters. To begin, first we recognize the following string
of inequalities, which will be helpful in the following analysis.
a31 > a11 = a12 = a22 = a21 > a33 = a34 = a44 = a43 > a24 > a14 (3.1)
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We seek to find the ESS. In general, the population may be playing all four strategies with
proportions expressed in the tuple x. Let x = (xTF2T,xTFT,xSTFT,xAD), where ∑
i∈I
xi = 1
and I = {TF2T,TFT,STFT,AD}. This problem may have at most 15 evolutionary stable
strategies, including four involving one pure strategy, six involving two pure strategies, four
involving three pure strategies, and one involving all four pure strategies.
For each subset I˜ ⊆ I, we want to determine whether there exists an ESS that involves all
strategies in I˜ and none in I \ I˜. Write A˜ for the sub matrix of A by removing rows and
columns not in I˜. If there exists an ESS that involves all strategies in I˜, then the population
distribution among the strategies, denoted by x˜, must be chosen so that for each strategy
in I˜, the expected utility against the population distribution x˜ must be the same. Hence,
a necessary condition for x˜ to constitute an ESS is for x˜ to satisfy the following equation,












The solution x˜ to the preceding equation is only a necessary condition for x˜ to be an ESS,
but not a sufficient condition. For x˜ to be an ESS, we need to verify that it will not be
invaded by the strategies in any strategy i /∈ I˜. In other words, we need to verify that the
expected utility for any strategy i /∈ I˜ against x˜ is strictly less than v. Mathematically, we
need to verify that
∑
j∈I˜
ai jx˜ j < v (3.3)
for i 6= I˜.
3.2 ESS Involving One Pure Strategy
A pure strategy constitutes an ESS, if it is best to play that pure strategy when everyone
else in the population plays that same pure strategy. In other words, a pure strategy is an
ESS, if and only if a diagonal entry in the matrix A is the largest in its column.
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3.2.1 AD Pure ESS
The AD constitutes an ESS solution for this game, since against a population of players
always defecting, a single player can do no better than to defect along with everyone else.
3.2.2 TFT Pure ESS
For TFT to be a stable pure strategy, the pay-off to a player playing TFT needs to be the
greatest among four strategies, given that everyone else is playing TFT. In other words, we
require
a2,2 > a4,2 and a2,2 > a3,2.
Solving for N gives two conditions for the limiting population, for which cooperation can
be maintained, as long as either condition is met.








This means that depending on the sign of P+R− S−T , if the population is less than the
appropriate threshold, everyone plays TFT. However, if the population should grow past
the threshold then all players would immediately revert to AD.
3.2.3 STFT Pure ESS
For STFT to be a stable pure strategy, the pay-off to a player playing STFT needs to be the
greatest among four strategies, given that everyone else is playing STFT. In other words,
we require
a1,3 < a3,3 and a2,3 < a3,3.
Solving for N gives two conditions for the limiting population, for which cooperation can
be maintained, as long as either condition is met.
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A large population may be all playing STFT in a suspicious ESS. However, if the population
decreases beyond a certain threshold, the population may be invaded by TF2T players, who
will begin cooperation.
3.2.4 TF2T Pure ESS
TF2T by itself can never be a ESS since the best one player can do against TF2T is STFT,
as seen by a3,1 > a2,1 in (3.1).
3.3 ESS Involving Two Pure Strategies
In this section, we use equation (3.2) to determine a necessary condition on the population




= 6 cases. Recall that we
need to use equation (3.3) to determine whether an ESS does exist, which will be done in
Chapter 4.
3.3.1 TF2T and TFT
For this strategy pair the game matrix becomes degenerate with all four elements of A˜
being equal. In this case, it is clear that any distribution of the population between the
two strategies is a candidate for ESS. For each population distribution, one needs to use
equation (3.3) to verify whether it is indeed an ESS.
3.3.2 STFT and AD
For this strategy pair the game matrix also becomes degenerate with all four elements of
A˜ being equal. Thus any distribution of the population between the two strategies is a
candidate for ESS. For each population distribution, one needs to use equation (3.3) to
verify whether it is indeed an ESS.
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3.3.3 TF2T and STFT
























Since a˜11 < a˜21, if a˜12 ≤ a˜22, then STFT dominates TF2T. In that case an ESS does not
exist with only these two strategies active. As a necessary condition for an ESS for the
population with TF2T and STFT strategies active, we solve a˜12 > a˜22, or equivalently,
S+αβ
R
N (1−αβ ) > P+αβ
P
N (1−αβ ) .
Solving for a threshold population value gives a necessary condition, for which an ESS






Below this threshold there may be an ESS with some in the population playing TF2T and
the rest playing STFT. Above the threshold the entire population would revert to playing
STFT, as suspicion will be their best option. We emphasize that equation (3.4) is only a
necessary condition for an ESS, and one needs to use equation (3.3) to verify whether it is
indeed an ESS.
3.3.4 TFT and STFT




























) P+αβ ( PN(1−αβ ))

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For an ESS with both TFT and STFT to be active at the same time there can be two cases:

































These can be simplified to give the following necessary condition for ESS.



















2. a˜1,1 < a˜2,1 and a˜1,2 > a˜2,2. These are the same inequalities, with the inequal-
ity signs reversed. This is simplified to find the following necessary condition on an
ESS.
P< T +S−R and αβ
1−αβ
2R−S−T





3.3.5 TF2T and AD



























Since a˜12 < a˜22, if a˜11 ≤ a˜21 also holds, then AD dominates TF2T. Therefore, a mixed














1−αβ (1− 1N )) .









In this case an ESS may exist with some playing AD, while the rest play TF2T. Above the
threshold, the entire population reverts to playing AD.
3.3.6 TFT and AD




TFT R+αβ RN(1−αβ ) S+αβ
P
N(1−αβ )





Since a˜12 < a˜22, an ESS with both strategies may exist only when a˜11 > a˜21, which results






Similar to the previous sections, this equation gives a threshold below which cooperation
is preferred to defection. We may expect the population to have an ESS in which at least
a certain proportion are cooperating by using TFT. Above the threshold, all will revert to
playing AD.
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3.4 ESS Involving Three Pure Strategies
The full game matrix A in (2.4) contains two 2x2 sub-matrices along the main diagonal
whose elements are all equal. Removing any strategy from the game will leave a 3x3
matrix, which we call A˜. The sub-matrix A˜ contains at least one of the two degenerate
sub-matrices. A three-strategy ESS can be represented by probability vector x˜ ∈ R3 whose





for some v ∈ R. In particular, the two rows that contain the degenerate 2x2 sub-matrix






















































) P+αβ ( PN(1−αβ ))

The equality between the first two rows of the condition expressed in (3.5) is then
x˜1a˜1,1+ x˜2a˜1,2+ x˜3a˜1,3 = x˜1a˜2,1+ x˜2a˜2,2+ x˜3a˜2,3.
But since a˜1,1 = a˜1,2 = a˜2,1 = a˜2,2, the preceding simplifies to
a˜1,3 = a˜2,3.
The result is simply an equality that can be solved for N as a function of α,β ,T,R,P,S. An
ESS with any three of the strategies, at best, may only exist for a precise population size,
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making it extremely unstable with relation to population changes.
3.5 ESS Involving Four Pure Strategies
An ESS with all four strategies active at the same time may exist only if there is no dom-
inance between the rows in matrix A. Due to the degeneracy in the two 2x2 sub-matrices
and the fact that a2,4 > a1,4, one of the following must hold for there to be no dominance
between rows.
1. a1,3 > a2,3 and a3,2 > a4,2 and a4,1 > a3,1. These inequalities do not result in any
feasible solutions for N.
2. a1,3 > a2,3 and a3,2 < a4,2 and a4,1 < a3,1. With some algebra, we can show that
an ESS involving all four pure strategies may exist if either of the following two
equations is true.
























In this section, we present a numerical analysis of the ESS for several case studies. For
each case study, we choose the four pay-off values T,R,P,S, as defined in Table 1.1. Since
we obtain an equivalent game when shifting these pay-off values by the same amount, or
scaling these pay-off values by the same positive constant, for any set of T,R,P,S we can
always normalize these values so that R= 1 and P= 0. The temptation pay-off T > R= 1
specifies how much it pays to cheat, and the pay-off S< P= 0 specifies how much it hurts
to get cheated.
4.1 Case Study with Large Temptation and Large Sucker’s
Payoff





The temptation pay-off T is substantially higher than R, and the sucker pay-off S is sub-
stantially lower than P.
For these parameters, we use equations (3.2) and (3.3) to determine the ESS, based on the
population size N and the compound discount factor αβ . The result is shown in Figure 4.1.
It may be noted, in this case, that the population in which some type of collaborative ESS
exists tends to be small.
For example, consider a standard army platoon of N = 42 men with a compound discount
factor of αβ = .95. The platoon will be in a stable ESS of cooperation based on all the men
playing TFT, in the bottom-right yellow region of 4.1. However, should the replacement
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rate grow, perhaps due to a low retention rate, then β decreases. The value of the future
will then be discounted more heavily. As αβ < .934, a phase shift will occur, which will
introduce suspicion and defection into the platoon.
At this point, we may expect that some men will request a transfer out of the platoon, as
the ESS is rather poor to live with. As a result, the future may be further discounted. The
increase in β , in turn, may bring an increase in the proportion of men playing AD until
an ESS of constant defection is reached. This case study shows the importance of a low
mobility rate in small, cooperative groups.
Figure 4.1: The potential ESS zones corresponding to the case of T=1.14, R=1, P=0 and
S=-0.29. The red area represents combinations of N and αβ , for which the only stable ESS is
constant defection by everyone in the population. The blue, next on the way towards the bottom
right corner of the chart, represents an area in which TFT and AD are in a mixed ESS or TFT
exists as a pure strategy ESS. In addition to those two states, the white area is a region in which
all 4 strategies are an ESS. In the grey, a STFT and TF2T mixed equilibrium exists, as well. In
the bottom-right yellow region only a pure TFT or a STFT-TF2T mix occurs.
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4.2 Case Study with Small Temptation and Large Sucker’s
Payoff





The temptation pay-off T is slightly higher than R, and the sucker pay-off S is substantially
lower than P.
For these parameters, we calculate what type of ESS are possible depending on the pop-
ulation size and on the compound discount factor αβ . The result is shown in Figure 4.2.
It may be noted, in this case, that the population in which some type of collaborative ESS
exists tends to be large.
For example, we consider a town with a population of N = 500 and a discount factor of
αβ = .996 existing in an ESS of everyone playing TFT. As long as the town does not grow
and the population remains stationary, there is no reason for anyone in the town to behave
in any way other than cooperative.
Should the population of the town ever increase past N = 640 the system may enter an
ESS with all four strategies present. While some people will continue to play TFT, some
people may see the opportunity to play STFT or AD to obtain the temptation pay-off T . If a
substantial fraction of people play STFT, then some people may become motivated to play
TF2T in order to reach cooperation. The presence of TF2T in the population will also make
AD more attractive, for it will produce two temptation pay-offs at the beginning against a
TF2T player. If the population continues to increase, the benefit of playing STFT and AD
will also increase. In the end, everyone will play either STFT or AD and no cooperation is
possible.
An increase in population mobility, even without changing population size, will reduce the
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value of the future as it is modeled by a reduced memory retention, causing a decrease
in the value of the future and thus a change in ESS. If the value of the discount factor is
reduced below .996 the only ESS position for the population will be AD by everyone. If
that happens we may expect the town to be abandoned by many citizens, until at some point
the population will be reduced enough, to cause another phase change back into the fold of
cooperation.
Figure 4.2: The potential ESS zones corresponding to the case of T=1.02, R=1, P=0 and
S=-0.29. The red area represents combinations of N and αβ , for which the only stable ESS is
constant defection by everyone in the population. The blue, next on the way towards the bottom
right corner of the chart, represents an area in which TFT and AD are in a mixed ESS or TFT
exists as a pure strategy ESS. In addition to those two states, the white area is a region in which
all 4 strategies are an ESS. In the grey, a STFT and TF2T mixed equilibrium exists, as well. In
the bottom-right yellow region only a pure TFT or a STFT-TF2T mix occurs.
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4.3 Case Study with Small Temptation and Small Sucker’s
Payoff





The temptation pay-off T is slightly higher than R, and the sucker pay-off S is slightly lower
than P.
For these parameters, we calculate what type of ESS are possible depending on the popu-
lation size and on the compound discount factor αβ . The result is shown in Figure 4.3. It
may be noted, in this case, that the most robust ESS involves the suspicious strategy, STFT.
We consider a start-up company of N = 50 employees. Since the future of the enterprise
is uncertain we use αβ = 0.7. The managers have managed to raise the required funds
to significantly expand their business. They may hire 100 additional employees over the
course of a short period of time. As a result, the population of the company would be
N = 150, and the unanimous cooperation that gave the group their edge, will become an
ESS of the suspicious strategy with TFT. If the team manages to pull through the expansion
phase, their future may become more certain, bringing the value of the future parameters
up. If αβ > 0.76 then cooperation based on pure TFT would once more become the norm.
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Figure 4.3: The potential ESS zones corresponding to the case of T=1.02, R=1, P=0 and
S=-0.01. The red area represents combinations of N and αβ , for which the only stable ESS
is constant defection by everyone in the population. The yellow, next on the way towards the
bottom right corner of the chart, represents an area in which TFT and STFT are in a mixed
ESS. In the grey region, a STFT and TF2T mixed equilibrium exists, as well as a pure strategy
ESS of TFT.
4.4 Case Study with Large Temptation and Small Sucker’s
Payoff





The temptation pay-off T is substantially higher than R, and the sucker pay-off S is slightly
lower than P.
For these parameters, we calculate what type of ESS are possible depending on the popu-
lation size and on the compound discount factor αβ . With these parameters the region of
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suspicious ESS is clearly much larger than in the previous section, as seen by a comparison
of Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.3.
We return to consider the start-up company from the previous section. A group operat-
ing under these pay-offs would expect to become suspicious at a much earlier phase of
recruitment. For a value of compound discount factor of αβ = 0.7 even a population of
N > 14 would begin to exhibit suspicion. However, this set of parameters is more robust
with respect to complete loss of cooperation. It can be seen that this situation may sup-
port a suspicious collaboration even for a group as large as N = 250. This extension of
cooperation by use of suspicion may be of advantage in certain situations.
Figure 4.4: The potential ESS zones corresponding to the case of T=1.14, R=1, P=0 and
S=-0.01. The red area represents combinations of N and αβ , for which the only stable ESS
is constant defection by everyone in the population. The yellow, next on the way towards the
bottom right corner of the chart, represents an area in which TFT and STFT are in a mixed
ESS. In the grey region, a STFT and TF2T mixed equilibrium exists, as well as a pure strategy
ESS of TFT.
29




Research has shown that cooperation is constrained with relation to group size. In this the-
sis, we present a model for interaction in a finite population of size N, engaged in iterative
rounds of prisoner’s dilemma. The model allows us to explore conditions for the viability
of cooperative equilibrium. We are also able to explain the importance of suspicion, as a
form of behavior that inhibits uncooperative behavior, under certain conditions. Among the
factors used to explain conditions for cooperation, a model for memory in the population
is presented, as a geometric random variable, which can also be used to model mobility of
individuals in the population.
Several strategies are used by the population in the model. Tit-for-two-tats, tit-for-tat,
suspicious-tit-for-tat and constant defection allow a study of some social phenomenon.
There are 15 different possible combinations of strategies, each involving either one, two,
three or four pure strategies, that may be prevalent in the population. We find the different
necessary conditions for combinations of strategies to become equilibrium states, using for
this purpose the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).
For any parameters of the game an upper limit on population size was found, above which,
the only ESS is constant defection by everyone in the population. All the different con-
ditions found for a population size, that allow a collaborative ESS, include a term that




This shows that increased population mobility results in significant lowering of viability of
cooperation. The different conditions on population, also depend on a ratio of differences,
of the pay-offs, of the single round prisoner’s dilemma. For some sets of parameter, the
collaborative ESS, that remains viable in the largest population, employs the suspicious
STFT strategy. This justifies the existence of suspicion in observed behavior, as a means to
ensure cooperation remains viable, despite temptation to defect.
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In this thesis, several assumptions may not be entirely realistic. First, each player has to
pick a strategy, which he uses for the whole game, from a set of four options, whereas
in real-life people may be more creative in choosing a strategy. Second, we use the geo-
metric distribution to model an individual’s memory, and also for the duration of time an
individual stays in the population before moving out. Third, we assume that the popula-
tion is homogeneous; that is, every individual has the same value functions. In real-life,
however, the pay-off for cooperation may be higher for some people than for some other
people. Fourth, we assume that each individual will encounter every other individual in the
population with the same probability, whereas in real-life neighbors may encounter more
frequently. Relaxing these assumptions presents challenging future research directions.
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